DRIVEN by concerns over Russia and growing uncertainty about the future of US protection, the European Union has released a roadmap urging increased military spending, collaborative defence initiatives and greater reliance on European-made weapons.
In a White Paper on defence, the European Commission laid out recommendations to ensure Europe maintains a “strong and sufficient” defence posture by 2030.
Kaja Kallas, the EU’s top diplomat and former Estonian Premier, described the current moment as pivotal, stating, “The international order is undergoing changes of a magnitude not seen since 1945.
This is a pivotal moment for European security.
It is a pivotal moment for action,” while pointing to America’s increasingly hostile stance toward Europe.
Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin justified his invasion and annexation of Ukraine as an act of self-defence against NATO’s eastward expansion.
Yet, the majority of UN members opposed his actions.
Those that did not—including China and North Korea—share his aim of counterbalancing US dominance.
Furthermore, a world order may become stronger or weaker due to transnational forces like ideas or revolutionary movements that can spread beyond the control of governments and change public perceptions of the legitimacy of the current order, domestic social and political changes that affect a major state’s foreign policy, or technological advancements that change the balance of military and economic power.
For instance, the idea of state sovereignty was established in the normative international order following the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which put an end to the religious conflicts in Europe.
However, shifts in the allocation of power resources accompany modifications in the legitimacy principles.
Since the US had grown to be the largest economy in the world by the time of World War I, it was able to militarily intervene and influence the war’s conclusion.
US domestic politics drove the nation toward isolationism, which allowed the Axis countries to try to impose their own order in the 1930s, despite US President Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to alter the normative order through his League of Nations.
The US controlled half of the global economy after World War II, but the Soviet Union counterbalanced its military might and the UN’s normative authority was limited.
The US experienced a brief “unipolar moment” following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, but overextended itself in the Middle East and allowed financial mismanagement that led to the 2008 financial crisis.
In response, China and Russia altered their policies, believing the US was deteriorating.
China adopted a more forceful foreign strategy after Putin’s invasion of Georgia, replacing Deng Xiaoping’s cautious approach.
Meanwhile, China’s strong economic expansion enabled it to surpass the US in power.
Although the US’ share of the global economy has remained around 25%, its relative power has decreased compared to China.
The US could retain more than half of the global economy as long as it maintained strong ties with Europe and Japan, while China and Russia would account for only 20%.
If Kaja Kallas is correct, we are at a tipping point in global affairs.
The crucial question is whether the Trump Administration can preserve this special source of America’s ongoing power.
Key years since the establishment of the UN include 1945, 1991 and 2008.
If 2025 is added to that list, it will likely be due to US policy—or more specifically, Trump’s policy.
—The writer is Assistant Professor, Szabist University. (mustafaraza44@gmail.com)
