INDIA surprised the world on 11 May 1998 by conducting three nuclear underground explosions and two on 13 May. The PM of India very proudly announced that we have become sixth nuclear weapon state and should be treated by the world as such. At the same time, Indian stance towards Pakistan became aggressive. The senior Indian hierarchy started giving provocative statements. The Indian Home Minister L.K Advani made a statement of Indian intention to cross the LoC under the pretext of hot pursuit. The Corps Cdr in Indian Illegally Occupied Kashmir (IIOJK) held an unprecedented news conference and advocated his plans to attack Azad Kashmir across the LoC. As a declared nuclear state and almost negligible international reaction, India was clearly placed in a better position than Pakistan.
The PM, Nawaz Sharif, was on official visit to Kazakhstan. He talked to Gen Jehangir Karamat, Chairman JCSC and COAS, it was decided to hold a meeting of Defence Committee of Cabinet (DCC) upon his arrival. However, according to Naeem Salik, (The Genesis of South Asia Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective p141) Gen Karamat’s account of the event is little different. The PM called General and told him to start preparations for the test. He suggested the PM to return to Pakistan as soon as possible, and then the decision would be taken after deliberation in DCC, the institution designed to deliberate and take such decisions. It is relevant to clarify speculation about whether the decision was taken by political leadership or was it thrust upon it by the military. The DCC meeting was held on 13 May chaired by the PM, attended by Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, Interior Minister, Chairman JCSC, and Services Chiefs. In addition Dr. A Q Khan and Dr. Samar Mubarakmand attended as reps of KRL and PAEC respectively. A lot of deliberations had taken place to decide appropriate response. The opportunity provided by India to become nuclear state and the economic challenges were pondered thoroughly. The meeting was like a war cabinet taking the decision in a crisis mode where the DCC members were evaluating all the implications of testing, under tremendous economic and international pressures. It was virtually an undeclared emergency situation. Armed forces were alerted for extra safe guards of the sensitive areas.
The test tunnels prepared at Ras Koh have to be provided extra security which was entrusted to Corps Cdr at Quetta, Navy augmented the sea patrol and PAF flew Combat Air Patrol (CAP). On political front all the opposition parties were for the nuclear detonation. A unanimous resolution was passed in Senate for an effective response to the Indian tests. In accordance with Gohar Ayub, the Foreign Minister (Testing Times, p35), General Jehangir Karamat, views were, we could match India, but the decision to do so would have to be political. Dr Samar informed the DCC that PAEC will take 10 days to conduct the tests. Later when Dr. Ishfaq, Chairman PAEC returned from abroad, gave the positive reply about the preparations.The cabinet meeting was called on 14 May, which supported the option of going for nuclear. Also Finance Minister was tasked to evaluate the effect of sanctions and for development of contingency plan in consultation with the concerned ministries and state bank. It was proposed conversion of foreign currency accounts into Rupee at official exchange rate (About $ 7bn). Banks to offer attractive rates on these rupee accounts. The PM gave the ‘final go ahead’ on 18 May to Chairman PAEC to carry out tests. All parties conference was called on 24 May by PM to inform about the decision of detonation which was unanimously supported (CISS Insight Special Issue on Youme e Takbeer p27-30).
The President of USA Bill Clinton had telephoned the PM, a few times and offered lucrativeeconomic packages. At the same time he elucidated the difficulties to be faced as economic sanctions. In addition President of USA, sent a delegation headed by Mr. Strobe Talbot, the then Deputy Security of State, and General Anthony Zinni, head of US Central Command to persuade Pakistan not to respond. The delegation was initially declined but later allowed to visit Pakistan. It met several times the PM, his Ministers, Gen Jehangir Karamat but was unable to convince them not to carry out the nuclear test (Daily Dawn, June 6, 2004, Sharif Government refused to receive USN-delegation). Seventeen days before the nuclear devices were detonated, were very difficult, for the PM, Ministers and Army Chief to sustain external pressure not to detonate especially from USA. On 27 May a day before tests US President called the PM about five times not to carry out tests and used carrot and stick (Sartaj Aziz, Between Dreams and Realities, p194). In the decision making process, the government also sought the views of retired defence and economic experts. According to Air Marshal Asghar Khan (We Have Learnt Nothing from History p243), Nawaz Sharif sent one of his ministers to seek my advice and I advised him not to do so.
On 28th Mayat 3:15 PM, the button was pressed by saying “Allah-o-Akbar” by a member of the team headed by Dr Samar Mubarakmand in the presence of Dr AQ Khan. A total 5 nuclear bombs were exploded. Soon after the tests, the Prime Minister announced that Pakistan has become the seventh nuclear power. The sixth was exploded on 30 May. This day is remembered as Youme -e-Takbeer. The decision making process to detonate was painstakingly contemplated taking into account all pros and cons. However, the nation was not sufficiently prepared by the government nor whole heartedly supported after the explosions by the opposition that they will face tremendous financial hardships due to financial sanctions. The decision regarding foreign currency accounts did not augur well amongst the masses, especially business men, and internationally. Even today when there are financial crises people think that restrictions may be imposed. This impression needs to be dispelled
—The author is Commodore(r), Honorary Fellow at NIMA, former Senior Research Fellow at NIMA and SVI.
Email: anjum8602@gmail.com
