Afghan future — between hope and peril
THE Biden administration has assured of completing the military exit by the 20th anniversary of 11 September 2001, attacks that drew the United States into its longest war.
Though the Biden administration’s decision to finally make an exit strategy from Afghanistan sounds logical, yet a military withdrawal without a rehabilitation plan is not the answer of the Afghan syndrome, Ultimately US soft power role —in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan whose economic, political, and social weltans chauungen haves been dismembered during the twenty years of war—is a logical preposition.
Today, America should not repeat the past mistake that it committed after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1989.
John Sopko, the US Department of Defence’s special inspector for Afghanistan reconstruction, told a House of Representatives committee recently that without US military and financial support, the Afghan government in Kabul could face collapse.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has outlined plans for talks between Afghan parties and the Taliban on a transitional government.
Muhammad Naim, a Taliban spokesman, told Al Jazeera that the group did not believe an interim government could deal with the country’s challenges.
“Transitional governments were formed after the American occupation, some of them transitional, others participatory but none of them have solved the country’s problems,” Naim added,’’ If there is one thing the United States should have learned after two decades in Afghanistan, it’s that there are no quick fixes’’.
In January 2021, the Trump Administration reported that it had reduced U.S. forces in Afghanistan to 2,500, the lowest level since 2001, in advance of the potential full military withdrawal by May 2021 to which the United States committed in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.
As part of that agreement, in return for the full withdrawal of international forces, the Taliban committed to preventing other groups, including Al Qaeda, from using Afghan soil to recruit, train, or fundraise toward activities that threaten the United States or its allies.
Hardly deniable is the fact that future political arrangements and/or changes in the security environment may in turn influence US policymakers’ consideration of future levels and conditions of development assistance.
Given the outsized role that US support plays in bolstering the Afghan government, many experts warn that a full-scale US withdrawal without a reconstruction plan could lead to its collapse — making internal and external chaos in Afghanistan. The postponement of the Istanbul moot is not a good omen for peace negotiations.
The history of the post-Soviet Afghanistan glaringly endorses this argument. By any measures, the Taliban are in a stronger military position now than at any point since 2001, though many once-public metrics related to the conduct of the war have been classified or are no longer produced.
Some Afghan officials reportedly suspect the Taliban remaining in negotiations long enough to secure a full U.S. withdrawal, after which the Taliban would capitalize on their advantage on the battlefield to seize control of the country by force.
“The future of Afghan security, post-withdrawal will depend on how well the Afghan Taliban are brought back into the fold,” said Michael Keating, a senior fellow at the University of Massachusetts.
The US will withdraw all American troops from Afghanistan over the coming months The U.S. current proposal forwarded to the Ashraf Ghani Government through the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reflects a boiling over of Washington’s frustrations with Ghani.
The Afghan leader’s critics have accused him of obstructing a peace process that has sapped his government of its already tenuous authority, with the Taliban insurgency operating freely throughout much of the countryside.
Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh reacted most bluntly, saying Afghanistan would “never accept a bossy and imposed peace.”
Ghani knows that the main Afghan enthusiasts of the transitional government idea are his political opposition and the country’s former Mujahideen.
In 2006, American political scientist Joseph Nye established a bipartisan Commission on Smart Power with former Bush deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage.
Although acknowledging that “America should have higher ambitions than being popular” it asserted that foreign opinion matters to U.S. decision-making. A good reputation fosters goodwill and brings acceptance for unpopular ventures.
Helping other nations and individuals achieve their aspirations is the best way to strengthen America’s reputation abroad.
This approach will require a shift in how the U.S. government thinks about security.
Undeniably, the growing uncertainty surrounding the future of international donor assistance has strained the Afghan economy.
While the United States and its allies have pledged to provide support to Kabul, the transition to a peacetime economy risks further destabilizing Afghan society by inflating the budget deficit and increasing unemployment rates.
Being a proponent to the Obama administration’s goals, the Biden administration must focus on rebuilding Afghanistan in the post -withdrawal phase.
This role will not only restore America’s image in the world, but it will also ensure the suffering Afghan community about a global power’s soft power role amid the crisis situation.
The best viable strategy to make peace a sustainable value to the Afghan society, is to involve the other stake holders like China and Russia in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, but that is only possible if Washington thinks positively about the CPEC-driven development trajectory in the region.
Obviously, to make the South Asian region economically stable and sound, there isa need of the global powers’ nexus in rebuilding Afghanistan.
What US policymakers need to recalibrate is a pragmatic restraint strategy vis-à-vis the future Taliban regime in Afghanistan it must be the pivot of confidence -building measures based on mutual trust and understanding.
Pentagon’s orchestrated new counterterrorism strategy— out of Afghanistan (prima facie, reflected in Centcom Commander General Kenneth F. McKenzie’s outlook on Afghanistan)—to remain in Afghanistan’s neighbourhood via soliciting its military bases on the pretext that Pentagon apprehends regrouping of Al Qaeda/Daesh networks in the region—seems no more workable alternative since no country would like to compromise its sovereignty, particularly, Pakistan.
And above all, it will be tantamount to waging another proxy war in the region. Pakistan will not encourage it, nor indulge in it.
—The writer, an independent ‘IR’ researcher-cum-international law analyst based in Pakistan, is member of European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on IR, Critical Peace & Conflict Studies, also a member of Washington Foreign Law Society and European Society of International Law.
