Afghanistan: Pak-China convergence & the West
GIVEN the ongoing tussle of power interests in Afghanistan, the truth is that the Western powers and India are displeased with Pak-China policy congruity in Afghanistan.
In terms of foreign relations, China and Pakistan form a congruity of policymaking as vindicated by the fact that after Islamabad’s refusal to attend an India — sponsored conference on Afghanistan, Beijing had also refused to participate in it.
If Beijing puruses its economic interests in Afghanistan, Islamabad is defending its security interests there.
On 02 November, Pakistan National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf, while addressing a press conference in Islamabad along with the Uzbekistan NSA, said: “I will not go, a spoiler can’t be a peacemaker,” in response to a question on whether Islamabad would attend India’s meeting. Yusuf said: “I think the region’s obstacles are in front of you, there is no need for debate on this.
On one hand is India… unfortunately (because of) the government’s behaviour and ideology there, I don’t see how this (peace) process will move forward — not just for Pakistan but the region.” “The world has unfortunately kept its eyes closed and isn’t talking to India as it should,” he said.
Many strategists in the Western and Indian media have linked the Afghan Taliban’s seizure of power with the cascade of geopolitical dynamism characterizing China-US relations, China-India relations and India-Pakistan relations.
They argue that the successful seizure of power by the Afghan Taliban is a success of China and Pakistan, but a strategic failure of the US, the West and India.
The reason is very simple that why they have this faulty interpretation is mainly their geopolitical-competition thinking and zero-sum game thinking.
As for the Chinese role in the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, India has been demonstrating a devil’s advocacy by projecting that Beijing is eyeing the untapped mineral resources in Afghanistan, which are estimated to have a value of $1 to $3 trillion.
From the Indian perspective, with the change of government in Afghanistan (the Taliban take over), New Delhi may usher in new era of its external relations policy where the US troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan is likely to accelerate current trends in India’s relations with the United States, China, and Russia: greater cooperation with Washington, deeper conflicts with Beijing and wider fissures in the traditional strategic partnership with Moscow.
Sadly, there has been a maligned western agenda to see the Pak-Afghan partnership via jaundiced eye, as a recent report published by the USIP says, “That conflict is almost certain to intensify after the US and international forces withdraw, battlefield developments will take centre stage.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship is likely to further deteriorate, and vitriol on both sides could foreclose on any remaining opportunities to reach a negotiated settlement.
Bilateral ties will likewise influence security, political, and economic dynamics in the medium to long-term, either after the conflict reaches a stalemate or after a new government takes shape.’’
That said, it appears no secret to the international community, the role India has been mischievously playing in Afghanistan is nothing but a conspiracy beyond conspiracy to destabilize Pakistan from Afghan soil.
The seeds of dissension and trust deficit sown by the Indian Administration have severely damaged the fabric of diplomatic understanding between Islamabad and New Delhi. If India has to play a role in Afghanistan, it is unlikely to play a positive one.
India is likely to use its intelligence agencies and some forces cultivated in Afghanistan and its surrounding areas in the past more than 20 years to undermine and disrupt the stability of Afghanistan. This is unfavourable to Afghanistan and its close neighbours, including China and Pakistan.
Key interests of China and Pakistan in Afghanistan, and their mutual cooperation to pursue them.
It identifies security, energy, connectivity and geopolitics as China’s main interests. Get recognition of the Durand Line as an international border with Afghanistan, prevention of ‘hostile elements’ from using Afghan territory and access to the CARs as those of Pakistan’s motives.
Both sides—China and Pakistan cooperated with each other on Afghanistan under the umbrella of their strategic partnership.
Islamabad helped in establishing initial Taliban-China contacts and persuaded the Taliban for negotiations with the USA and Kabul authorities.
Beijing pragmatically supported Islamabad’s Afghan policy and mediated between Islamabad–Kabul, and Taliban–Kabul negotiations.
China and Pakistan backed their diplomacy with economic assistance and extended CPEC and BRI to Afghanistan.
Amidst various challenges, thus far Sino-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan has benefited to their mutual interests and contributed to the peace process. Afghanistan has emerged as a new chapter of their relationship.
Beijing’s major interest in securing economic gains can be achieved by using Afghanistan’s position as a regional connector in either the Belt and Road Initiative or China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
In addition, since 2007 China has been seeking ways to extract Afghanistan’s vast mineral wealth, which requires security and transportation infrastructure.
None of this is possible without a stable Afghanistan, so China is still assessing the political landscape in Afghanistan and what it could gain from a peace-establishing future there.
As for the US failures and Washington’s perceived role in Afghanistan, some of the western thinkers have a variety of appraisals: Charles Kupchan of Georgetown University, says that Biden was right to pull the plug on the Afghan government, and that the entire Western strategy was flawed from the outset, insofar as the goal was to establish a unitary, centralized state..
More radically, Columbia University’s Jeffrey D. Sachs sees in Afghanistan a longstanding pattern of dubious US military interventions in developing countries, arguing that American priorities once again betrayed policymakers’ contempt for the local population.
Needless to say, from the very beginning, the US- Afghan policy—a depiction of unpragmatic adhocism lacked vision—which badly sponsored political and economic ostracism of the Afghans.
A feeling of resentment has been strongly developed in the local Afghans about the West as they think that their major motive has been to impose their political or security agenda in the region.
—The writer, an independent ‘IR’ researcher-cum-international law analyst based in Pakistan, is member of European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on IR, Critical Peace & Conflict Studies, also a member of Washington Foreign Law Society and European Society of International Law.
