TWO years subsequent to the resurgence of the Taliban into power, no sovereign state has accorded recognition to their governance, despite their most earnest endeavours. The Taliban leadership has dispatched envoys on several diplomatic missions abroad, spanning China, Pakistan, Qatar and Russia, yet this assiduous diplomatic campaign has thus far yielded no success. Afghanistan remains ensnared in isolation and burdened by international sanctions. Three fundamental rationales elucidate the failure hitherto of their pursuit for recognition. Firstly, it resides in the Taliban’s suppression of women.
The curtailment of women’s entitlements to education, occupation and liberty of agency by the Taliban is precipitating the swift erosion of their sense of self. The state’s subjugation of women has effectively excluded them from nearly every sector of the labour realm and the recent proscription on women’s cosmetic establishments has further truncated their prospects for employment. These draconian policies, emblematic of the Taliban’s modus operandi, raise grave concerns concerning the human rights milieu in Afghanistan. A UN report in February underscores this stark actuality, contending that the denial of women and girls’ rights may constitute gender-based violence, a transgression against humanity.
Consequently, the Taliban’s systemic campaign against women and their violations of human rights render their regime noxious. Any entity which transgresses this threshold is liable to evoke global censure. A further rationale resides in the Taliban’s endeavour to establish an external governance that overtly discriminates against non-Pashtun ethno-linguistic groups within Afghanistan. The government has dismissed international calls for political inclusivity due to its capacity to do so and the likelihood of a diverse Taliban-led government materializing is as tenuous as a government truly representing the populace.
The Taliban opt to impose their narrow political predilections upon the Afghan populace, thereby employing coercive authority to suppress dissension, affording them the capacity to concentrate on cultivating domestic political legitimacy within their core base, namely the ethnic Pashtuns. Furthermore, they are enlisting staunch loyalists from their prior regime of ultra-conservative persuasion to contrive intricate networks of reverence, intermarriage and ethno-linguistic affiliations. Given that the edifice of the Taliban’s leadership hinges upon this specialized network, they are constructing a hierarchical and hierarchically centralized framework to administer external validation.
In August 2022, an aerial strike targeted al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, demonstrating al-Qaeda’s continued operations under Taliban support. A recent report from the United Nations Sanctions Monitoring Group has confirmed the rearmament, reorganization and recruitment efforts of about 20 recognized terrorist factions within Afghanistan. The proliferation of these groups, facilitated by an environment conducive to their activities, contradicts the commitments made by the Taliban under the February 2020 Doha Agreement. Furthermore, the Taliban’s local legitimacy stems from providing refuge to terrorist groups, which obstructs their pursuit of international recognition. Some of these groups represent the ethnic minority populations of northern Afghanistan and Central Asia, making their exclusion untenable. The probability of these groups establishing their own spheres of influence, seeking autonomy, or competing with the Taliban remains uncertain. However, all factions, including the Taliban, are capitalizing on the strategic void left after the United States’ withdrawal and the collapse of the Afghan government.
An additional aspect worth considering pertains to the Taliban’s view on international recognition. Their leadership sees diplomatic validation as desirable but not essential and this nuanced distinction is crucial in comprehending their goals in the realm of international engagement. The government’s primary objective is to bolster the struggling economy to safeguard its core economic interests, rather than the overall well-being of the Afghan populace. Moreover, they are striving to bypass international sanctions and exert strategic pressure on host nations, as well as on former Afghan government diplomats abroad, in an attempt to secure recognition or replace Taliban representatives. Concurrently, the Taliban leadership is aware of the international community’s keen interest in normalizing relations with their regime. This gives them the chance to leverage this interaction and maintain the prevailing power imbalance in their favour. Unfortunately, in assessing the Taliban, western diplomatic relations have shown a recurring tendency to interpret matters in line with their own preferences. It would be much more effective for statesmen to perceive the Taliban as they truly are, rather than through a lens of bias in other words, not as a remedy for the current situation.
—The writer, a PhD scholar, is associated with Islamia University Bahawalpur.
Email: akramzaheer86@yahoo.com
