OBVIOUSLY, the post-Assad Syria orchestrates a complex tapestry where Turkey’s role —amid the growing geopolitical race in the Middle East region —has become pivotal as it is viewed as a crucial foreign factor capable of reshaping the nation’s future. Given the geopolitical and geoeconomic imperatives entailed by the growing post-Assad Syrian dynamics, Turkey aims to handle the Syrian refugees issue and is also determined to play a transformative role of establishing public order, forming institutions and providing necessary resources there, but it faces hurdles in this way posed to Ankara because of the intervening dynamics of US-Israel role in Syria where they want to secure their own interests.
Turkey, a NATO member that shares a long southern border with Syria, opened its doors to the largest number of Syrian refugees of any country, according to United Nations data — peaking at more than 3.7 million in 2021 — many of whom were linked with opposition groups and under threat from the Assad regime. Turkish President Recep Tayyab Erdoðan had expressed a desire to restore friendly relations with Assad, resembling the close ties that preceded the Arab Spring uprisings. Yet subsequently in the end, Turkey failed to make peace with Assad, just as it failed to topple him a decade ago. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), though a Syrian organization, has had its roots in the Turkish-Kurdish insurgency. The United States decided to partner with the SDF when the Iraqi, Syrian, and Iraqi-Kurdish forces melted away at the height of the ISIS onslaught in 2014. This partnership was successful, and to this day, the United States maintains a force of roughly nine hundred soldiers in northern Syria in collaboration with the SDF to prevent the resurgence of ISIS.
Since 2022, Ankara marked a notable shift in its policy towards Syria, with Turkey explicitly abandoning the goal of regime change and initiating a process of normalization with Assad. This move was part of a broader policy of regional reconciliation aimed at repairing Turkey’s relations with former foes. Turkey’s ally among the rebels is the Syrian National Army (SNA), which, despite its name, is a wholly Turkish-owned entity. Since the defeat of ISIS, the Turks have been more concerned with the emergence of a Syrian-Kurdish entity in northern Syria led by the Syrian Democratic Forces, the SDF. Notably, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) leadership has also drawn a clear distinction between HTS and the Syrian National Army (SNA).While criticizing the SNA and Turkey’s interference as major obstacles, the SDF has hinted at a more conciliatory stance toward Hay ‘at Tahri al-Sham (HTS) and expressed its openness to negotiations. These dynamics, coupled with Turkey’s focus on suppressing Kurdish autonomy, could lead to friction between Turkey and HTS over conflicting priorities.
While HTS maintains an informal alliance with Turkey, the SNA operates as Turkey’s direct proxy, relying on Ankara for funding and guidance. This distinction became evident after the events of November 27, 2024 when sections of the SNA joined HTS’s offensive on Aleppo. However, once Aleppo fell, the two groups diverged. HTS advanced toward Damascus, while SNA factions shifted eastward under Turkey’s direction to target the Kurdish-dominated SDF. This divergence reflects differing objectives and relationships with Turkey. Yet, the ongoing power tussle among the geopolitical rivals has become a new tapestry of completion trajectory in the Middle East region, reflecting broader strategic ambitions and regional interests. Whereas, the relations between Ankara and Tehran regarding Syria’s future are significantly influenced. As Assad’s regime had relied on support from Russia and Iran to maintain control, now the potential for a power vacuum in Damascus could drastically alter the delicate balance of interests between Turkey and Iran.
Moreover, Turkey accepted the HTS role in Syria by strategically supporting it as part of its broader policy to weaken the Assad regime and counter Kurdish military forces in northern Syria. Turkey’s backing has helped solidify HTS’s position among the Syrian opposition, allowing it to play a significant role in the conflict and in the anti-Assad narrative, thereby aligning Turkey’s interests in the region, enabling it to maintain influence while managing the influx of Syrian refugees. Now, Ankara’s three strategic goals in Syria are: one, the establishment of a Sunni Islamist client state that will be part of Erdogan’s and his AKP party’s vision of restoring the Ottoman Empire (and as part of this, to build a Sunni-jihadist terror infrastructure against Israel in southern Syria); two, distancing the Kurdish forces of the SDF from Turkey’s borders and breaking the connection between the SDF and the Kurds in southern Turkey; and three, returning about 3 million Syrian refugees from Turkey back to Syria.
After Turkey, in the growing geopolitical race in the post-Assad Syria ,the two counties, none other than the US and Israel seek to protect their respective interests , hence a clash is brewing between Tel Aviv,Ankara and Washington over Syria’s future where Israel intends to create a fragmented state via establishing a buffer zone, also, the US intensifies its quest to get access to the Syrian oil fields which could produce around 400,000 barrels per day, and while Turkey is seriously concerned about the Kurdish Issue.
Nevertheless, in the post-Assad Syria landscape, the geopolitical stakeholders include various local and international actors. Key stakeholders are the United States, which has supported Kurdish forces; Turkey, which has backed anti-Assad Sunni Arab groups; Russia, a crucial backer of Assad; and Iran, also supportive of the Assad regime. Turkey’s role is particularly significant due to its interest in containing Kurdish autonomy, which it views as a direct threat, and its historical ties and influence in the region. The balance of power among these forces is pivotal in shaping Syria’s future and regional stability.
—The writer, based in Pakistan, an independent IR & International Law analyst, also an expert in Conflict and Peace Studies (with special focus on Palestine, Kashmir), is member of European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), including the Washington Foreign Law Society/American Society of International Law. He also deals with the strategic issues.
(rizvipeaceresearcher@gmail.com)
