AN eminent security and terrorism specialist, Muhammad Amir Rana, has described the present precarious security situation in Pakistan as resembling the security climate just before the 2014 era. During that time, various terrorist groups were deeply entrenched in Pakistan, openly collaborating to inflict significant harm on the state and society. The only additional challenge we face today is the support these terrorist groups receive from the Afghan Taliban government in Afghanistan. This support for the TTP was not available from the Ashraf Ghani regime in 2014.
On December 12, 2023, one of the deadliest attacks on Pakistan’s security forces occurred in the Draban area of Dera Ismail Khan, KP. Twenty-three soldiers were killed, and 30 others were wounded when six terrorists, affiliated with Tehreek-i-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), a faction of TTP, attacked a compound used by the Pakistan army in D.I. Khan. Following this, in retaliatory military operations in Dera Zinda and Kolachi areas of D.I. Khan, the initial six militants, along with 20 others, were killed.
According to intelligence sources, the leaders of the terrorist groups are based in Afghanistan and are orchestrating attacks from there. Pakistan has demanded immediate and verifiable action from the Afghan government against militant outfits responsible for terrorizing Pakistan. The Pakistani Foreign Secretary summoned the Afghan Chargé d’Affaires and issued a demarche, stressing the urgency and gravity of the situation and calling for a comprehensive investigation and decisive action against the perpetrators of the recent attacks. Emphasis was placed on the significant threat these actions pose to regional peace and stability Besides attacks on military and pro-military personnel, a significant recent trend is the increasing nexus between various terrorist groups. This collaboration has notably bolstered the confidence among these groups. Last week’s heinous attack on a passenger bus travelling along the Karakoram Highway in Gilgit-Baltistan serves as a stark reminder of the escalating terrorist threat looming over Pakistan.
High-intensity attacks on the Mianwali Training Air Base, a cross-border incursion in Chitral and the assault on military installations in Zhob Cantt in recent months underscore that terrorists have regained the confidence and capabilities they previously lost during the Zarb-e-Azb operations. The resurgence in confidence and capabilities by the TTP appears to have stemmed from the Taliban takeover in Kabul.
The militant landscape, throughout the country, is increasingly turning similar to that of the pre-2014 era, when multiple religiously motivated groups including sectarian ones like Lashkar-i-Jhangvi were active in various parts of the country. Lashkar-i-Jhangvi was considerably degraded during the operations in the wake of Zarb-i-Azb. But now reports suggest that they are launching a comeback, mostly in nexus with other religious militant groups. Besides the emergence of LJ, the presence of TTP in the Gilgit-Baltistan area is of considerable concern for the authorities, as the Chinese firms are working on the Dash dam project in the area. Notably, the TTP conducted an attack on a Chinese workers bus in 2022. In addition to these attacks, sectarian militant groups have also attacked buses, believed to be carrying passengers from another sect.
The resurgence of LJ is causing great concern among our authorities. Reports indicate the arrest of LJ militants in Karachi and the South of Punjab. LJ isn’t solely a sectarian terrorist organization; it also has a history of aligning with TTP and Al-Qaeda. Past investigations have revealed its association with these militant outfits in carrying out major terrorist attacks. In essence, the actors involved in present-day terrorist attacks are largely the same as those active before the Zarb-e-Azb operations. The main difference lies in the operational bases and leadership of these outfits, mostly situated across the border.
Historically, Al-Qaeda has masterminded major terrorist assaults on military installations in Pakistan with local support. The TTP, LJ and organizations like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have all played some role in these attacks. The terrorist attacks in 2023 indicate that a similar alliance has come into being, or the TTP has transformed and updated itself into an organization that can launch Al-Qaeda-style collaborative attacks. The Tehreek-i-Jihad Pakistan claimed responsibility for the Mianwali air base attack. This organization is surely a subsidiary of the TTP. It is also believed that the TJP has many Afghans among its fighters, besides recruits from all four provinces of Pakistan.
It is presumed that the TTP’s capacity to recruit fighters in Punjab, Balochistan, and Sind may be limited. Hence, they need the support from outfits with established organizational networks. Consequently, Lashkar-i-Janghvi (LJ) and other banned organizations like Jaish-e-Mohammad are suspected of providing such support due to their infrastructure in these areas. Further investigation is required to establish whether Al-Qaeda remains involved in organizing terrorist attacks like those executed by the TJP in recent months. Al-Qaeda’s presence in the region has weakened, but it hasn’t been completely eradicated.
Another crucial development in recent days is the revival of LJ. Due to persistent targeting by the authorities, the LJ had disappeared from the terrorist nexus for the last six to seven years. Its reappearance is certainly of great concern to the authorities, because the LJ not only provides valuable help to international terrorist outfits like Al-Qaeda, but also acts as the main recruiting ground for militant/terrorist enterprises in our region. Please proofread
To conclude, I strongly advocate for a diligent implementation of all clauses within the National Action Plan. Much like in 2014, the time has again arrived to launch a concerted and well-organized operation akin to Zarb-i-Azb against the terrorists. Reactive measures are no longer sufficient. Another strategy which can be usefully employed as part of our Counter Terrorist policy could be to try and decapitate the terrorist leadership. Our CT authorities should prioritize to target the leadership of the militants. Because this strategy has historically been more successful than capturing land and eliminating the rank and file. The weakening of AL-Qaida and Islamic State after the elimination of Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr AL-Baghdadi amply illustrates this fact. However, in contrast to 2014, we face two additional major challenges. Firstly, Pakistan’s current economic situation may not permit an operation as expansive as Zarb-i-Azb. Secondly, a friendly Taliban government in Afghanistan may pose challenges, making it harder for such an operation to succeed.
—The writer, based in Islamabad, is a former Health Minister of KP.
Email: marwat.akbarjan@gmail.com
views expressed are writer’s own.
