CLEARLY, India’ ambition to join world’s most important multilateral nuclear export control arrangement is highly questionable due to its dubious and discreditable nuclear credentials and aggressive approach in South Asia, characterised by neo-colonialist, unilateral tendencies as well as a propensity for high-risk nuclear brinkmanship and promoting terrorism which directly contradicts with the very mission of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Yet, in contrast to this reality, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Director General Rafel Mariano Grossi, during his recent visit to India (March 18-21)), showed his biased notion of premeditated favouritism regarding India’s NSG bid.
Encouraging India’s bid, he said when he was President of the NSG {2014-2016}, India’s NSG membership was close to being approved, Mr Groosi’s comments exposed the IAEA’s politically motivated actions, which are highly controversial and biased, marking a significant dent in the IAEA’s reputation for transparency.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group–also known as the London Club, formed in 1974–is a key 48- member body within the four major Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECR).
MECR are voluntary frameworks aimed at preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).
Needless to say, the aim of the NSG Guidelines is to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not pave way to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The NSG Guidelines facilitate the development of trade in this area by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a manner consistent with international nuclear non-proliferation norms.
The NSG’s criteria-based approach refers to the standards and requirements that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) States must meet to be considered for the NSG membership.
Currently, all 48 NSG members hold the NPT-status.
In May 2016, both India and Pakistan respectively applied for the NSG’ bid.
Pakistan upholds to maintain a non-discriminatory, criteria-based approach vis-à-vis the NSG bid.
As current NSG rules prioritize NPT signatories, India’s refusal to join the NPT has raised concerns by other NSG members, particularly by China, New Zeeland, Ireland and Australia, this reflects concerns about proliferation and adherence to international non-proliferation norms.
A uniform, criteria-based approach to NSG membership is fundamental to avoid country-specific biases.
Yet a non-criterion based approach as has been glaringly reflected in Grossi’s remarks about India mount concerns in the developing world’s community.
Given the criteria-based approach, certain intrinsic obstacles still hinder India’s qualification for the NSG bid.
These bottlenecks include:
1- India is not the NPT member.
2- India has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
3- Still, some NSG members view India’s non-proliferation credentials with grave concerns.
4- India seems to have violated the MTCR stipulations regarding its expanded missile programme, particularly Indian BDM program and its test of Agni-v ICBM (MIRV) posed grave challenges to strategic stability in the region.
5- India has an incredible record of nuclear safety and security manifested by various incidents of uranium theft, particularly Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) is alleged to commit HR violations in Jharkhand’s nuclear mines.
6- so far, India lacks required consensus in the Group.
7- India has committed serious breaches of international law—endorsed by the Modi’s government’s unilateral moves of revoking article 370 and 35-A and its illegal annexation of Jammu & Kashmir, including its latest suspension of a bilateral Indus Water Treaty.
8- Indian policy of nuclear brinkmanship and state-terrorism fundamentally undermines regional peace and stability.
Pakistan has been opposing India’s bid.
Pakistan emphasises on a non-discriminatory, criteria-based approach for NSG membership, advocating for consistent criteria for all applicants, including itself and India.
Further, Pakistan’s objections to India’s NSG bid are rooted in its profound concerns regarding India’s non-proliferation record and its implications for regional security.
Despite India’s memberships in other control regimes such as the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime MTC, yet not mandatory requirements for the NSG bid), Pakistan argues that India does not meet the NSG criteria.
Crucially, the Initiatives — like the 2008 US-India nuclear deal and an out-of-way NSG’s waiver granted to India — allowing it to participate in the global nuclear market for civilian application despite its nuclear weapons programme and the Non-NPT status — have already undermined the efficacy and creditability of the non-proliferation regime.
Conversely, overlooking India’s underserved nuclear credentials and any western-backed move of granting it the NSG membership would set a perilous precedent fundamentally undermining the NSG Guidelines.
Importantly, India’s actions on May 7th, 2025, are perceived as reckless and potentially escalating tensions with Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state.
India’s irresponsible behaviour as a nuclear state increased the risk of a nuclear conflict, highlighting the delicate balance and potential dangers inherent in the relationship between two nuclear powers, where miscalculations could have severe consequences.
Also, it is inevitably ascertainable that the western-backed hypocritical stance of the IAEA will serve to undermine respect for international law and reinforce a narrative of double standards.
Discernibly, the NSG needs to assess the security implications and potential impact on regional stability, applying consistent standards to both India and Pakistan to ensure that any decision promotes global nuclear safety.
Undeniably, Pak nuclear safety and security standard is stronger than India’s.
Also, Islamabad has the required nuclear capabilities to promote peaceful nuclear trade.
Therefore, if New Delhi is granted the NSG membership without being an NPT signatory, without any display of western bias and double standards, the same criteria should apply to Islamabad.
True, Pakistan’s entry into the NSG, alongside India, will undoubtedly foster a regional balance.
—The writer, based in Pakistan, an independent IR & International Law analyst, also an expert in Conflict and Peace Studies (with special focus on Palestine, Kashmir), is member of European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), including the Washington Foreign Law Society/American Society of International Law. (rizvipeaceresearcher@gmail.com)
