WHILE interaction and engagement between Pakistan and Afghanistan continue at different levels, the main issue of contention between the two powers is nowhere near resolution. Pakistan’s genuine security concerns from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), based in Afghanistan, have not been addressed in any meaningful way by the Afghan Government. Pakistan’s repeated warnings and protests seem to have little effect on the Afghan authorities.
When the Afghan Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan was hopeful that the friendly regime would help secure our western border. However, these expectations were not met, as border tensions persisted and terrorist attacks from the TTP across the border on our security forces increased manifold. The TTP leadership had taken refuge in Afghanistan since they were driven out of the tribal areas of Pakistan during Operation Zarb-i-Azb.
A UN team reported that the TTP benefited the most among all the foreign extremist groups based in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, statements by the Pakistan Army voiced serious concerns about “the safe havens and liberty of action available to the TTP in Afghanistan.” The Pakistan Army chief warned of an “effective response” by Pakistan’s security forces if attacks continued from within Afghanistan.
The surge in terrorist activities in 2023 led to a significant rise in security personnel casualties, reaching an eight-year high. Most attacks were carried out by TTP groups from within Afghanistan, leaving Islamabad increasingly bitter and frustrated. These attacks escalated after the collapse of a ceasefire between the Pakistani government and the TTP, deemed an unwise decision. The most audacious attack occurred in January 2023 at a mosque in Peshawar’s Police Lines, resulting in over 100 lives lost, predominantly policemen. Despite warnings to Taliban officials in Afghanistan, little action was taken.
Despite numerous rounds of talks and interactions with the Afghan Taliban last year, no tangible results were achieved. The Afghan Taliban gave no firm commitments to halt TTP attacks on Pakistan, citing capacity issues rather than lack of commitment. They requested financial assistance from Pakistan to relocate around 5,000 TTP fighters away from the Pak-Afghan border and disarm them, but ultimately reneged on their responsibility, claiming the TTP issue was solely Pakistan’s. The underlying reason was the shared ideology between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP, with the former unwilling to abandon the latter. The Afghan Taliban urged Pakistan to negotiate with the TTP instead of resorting to military action.
A recent story in the press further confirms Pakistan’s allegations. A report submitted by the ISIL and Al-Qaida/Taliban monitoring team to the United Nations Security Council indicates that the TTP receives significant backing from Al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban for executing attacks in Pakistan. These collaborations involve not only the provision of arms and equipment but also active on-the-ground support for the banned TTP’s operations against Pakistan.
The report highlighted that despite the Afghan Taliban’s official stance discouraging TTP activities outside Afghanistan, many TTP fighters have conducted cross-border attacks in Pakistan without significant repercussions. Some Taliban members driven by religious zeal have joined TTP ranks, enhancing their operations. TTP members and their families reportedly receive regular aid packages from the Afghan Taliban, indicating substantial support. Similarly, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent has provided training, ideological guidance and support to the outlawed TTP, illustrating the interconnected nature of these militant networks.
A high-level delegation was dispatched to Kabul in February 2023 to convey Pakistan’s red line on terror attacks from Afghan soil and secure a firm commitment from Kabul to rein in the TTP and deny its members the sanctuary they enjoy in Afghanistan.
In response to such duplicitous behaviour, Pakistani authorities began to shift course and adopted tough policies towards Afghanistan. Suggestions of talks with the TTP were strongly rejected. It was decided to deport tens of thousands of undocumented Afghans from the country and major changes in rules and regulations governing transit trade from Pakistan to Afghanistan were introduced. This led to thousands of stranded containers prevented from reaching Afghanistan. Islamabad intensified public criticism of Kabul for harbouring Pakistan’s enemies. All this showed that Pakistan was willing to deploy all its leverage with Afghanistan to pressure the Afghan regime.
In response, the Kabul regime, for the first time, indicated its willingness to mend fences with Islamabad, urging it to decouple trade from alleged terrorism from within Afghanistan. An Afghan delegation led by Kandahar Governor, Mullah Sharin Akhund, a close confidant of Mullah Habatullah Akhunzada, visited Pakistan to defuse tension between the two countries. The Afghan delegation requested Pakistan to show more flexibility on Afghan transit trade and slow down the repatriation of Afghan refugees, at least during the winter months. Pakistan made it clear that the resolution of the core issue of TTP terrorist attacks inside Pakistan from across the border was essential for all other issues to be resolved. Pakistan also made it clear that its patience on this issue was wearing thin.
Despite Pakistan’s clear message, the Afghan delegation prevaricated on the TTP issue, putting forward a host of excuses to buy time to deal with the TTP. The only positive aspect that came out of the talks with the Afghan delegation was the offer Mullah Sharin made to take Pakistan’s message to the Afghan Supreme Leader. In the backdrop of the report presented to the UN Security Council, Islamabad demanded from Afghanistan the extradition of TTP leaders involved in terrorist attacks in Pakistan, underscoring the need to bring those responsible for terrorism in Pakistan to justice.
The most important question is what Pakistan’s options are if the Afghan Taliban continue to show unwillingness to act against the TTP. There is no easy answer to this dilemma because there are limits to Pakistan’s leverage that it can use against the Taliban regime. Too much of a coercive approach may cause a rupture in the relations between the two countries, which Pakistan would like to avoid.
—The writer, based in Islamabad, is a former Health Minister of KP.
Email: marwat.akbarjan@gmail.com
views expressed are writer’s own.
