THE Baloch Liberation Army’s ambush of the Jaffar Express train and kidnapping of innocent unarmed civilians sent shock waves in the entire country.
Though the defence forces’ daring swift operation neutralized the terrorists and freed hundreds of hostages, the existential Baloch militants’ threat did not cease.
Indeed, the tactical achievements do not repudiate the need for a holistic counterterrorism grand strategy, i.e., synergy of kinetic and non-kinetic actions.
The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) attackers intercepted a train using an improvised explosive device 32km (20 miles) from Sibbi City, near a tunnel in the Bolan Pass region on March 11, 2025.
The terrorist group, known for its repeated tactic of segregating hostages based on ethnicity and killing Punjabis, once again used this method to ignite ethnic conflict.
For example, on February 18, 2025, BLA armed men intercepted a Faisalabad-bound passenger coach, checked the passengers’ National Identity Cards and executed seven people from different cities of Punjab.
Despite the BLA’s actions, the Balochs are not facing persecution in Punjab.
Pakistani armed forces immediately launched a military operation — named Operation Green Bolan — to release hundreds of passengers.
The precise and surgical ground operation was conducted by the Zarrar Company, an elite unit of the Army’s Special Services Group (SSG), specializing in operations against armed groups.
Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry said, “By midday on March 12, Zarrar Company had completed its situational assessment.
Tracking BLA communications revealed potential suicide bombers were stationed near the hostages.
They were eliminated first, after which the troops made their way inside the train.”
During the rescue operation 354 passengers were rescued and 33 terrorists belonging to the BLA were killed without a single hostage casualty.
However, 26 security officials and passengers had embraced martyrdom before the operation.
The Balochs’ distrust of the state results from a complex interplay of economic, political, institutional and societal factors.
This intricate web of factors has led to a violent situation driven by the interconnectedness of criminality, militancy and terrorism.
However, to understand the current brewing violence in Balochistan province, it’s important to contextualize it within the broader regional strategic environment.
The success of an insurgency depends on the availability of three sanctuaries, i.e., popular, physical and political, for the separatist group.
The Baloch militant groups have these sanctuaries.
They enjoy popular support (the acceptability of the cause among the local/Baloch community) in the province.
Therefore, they are able to recruit and radicalize youngsters for their separatist cause.
Unfortunately, the various politico-economic initiatives of the federal government have failed to end the popular sanctuary.
Comparatively, they have better physical and political sanctuaries than popular support.
The physical sanctuary— the rugged and mountainous topography of the province and the political sanctuary—immense strategic, financial and weaponry assistance from eastern and western neighbors of Pakistan.
They have safe hideouts in Afghanistan from where they plan and conduct terrorism in Balochistan.
Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Shafqat Ali Khan, said, “India has been involved in terrorism in Pakistan.
In the attack on Jaffar Express, the terrorists were in contact with their handlers and ring leaders in Afghanistan.”
The intelligence monitoring revealed the abductors were using walkie-talkies to communicate with their handlers in Afghanistan allegedly.
The United Nations report in February 2025 also testified that the Afghan Taliban government provides support to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the BLA has ties with both the TTP and the ISIL affiliate in Khorasan Province (ISKP).
The increasing influence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is also alarming.
Pakistan needs to rejuvenate and intensify its counterterrorism strategy in Balochistan so that law enforcement agencies preempt and prevent terrorist attacks instead of calibrating a response only after the event.
Admittedly, preemption is too tricky in asymmetrical warfare because the non-state actors employ guerilla warfare tactics.
Besides, the kinetic government must take non-kinetic initiatives, including politico-economic and reconciliation efforts, to quash the popular sanctuary of the BLA in the province.
Otherwise, the BLA continues misguiding, recruiting and training youngsters for terrorism.
One cannot underestimate the significance of the reconciliatory approach in managing and resolving the conflict.
However, it’s crucial to address the potential drawback of reconciliation, i.e., the adversary’s feeling of appeasement.
Such a realization can inadvertently boost the BLA’s spirit to continue violent attacks instead of pacifying a pressing issue that must be urgently addressed.
Chief Minister Balochistan Bugti pointed out that the past policy of ‘appeasement’ followed by some previous governments toward terrorist groups resulted in the release of key militants and enabled them to reestablish insurgent camps against the state.
Hence, immense cautiousness is imperative while adopting a reconciliatory approach in pacifying the dissidents in Balochistan.
—The writer is Prof at the School of Politics and IR, Quaid-i-Azam University.(jaspal_99@hotmail.com)
