THE Cold War rivalry between the US and the former Soviet Union was marked by proxy conflicts and the credible threat of nuclear retaliation, which prevented a direct military confrontation.
Both powers developed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) by the late 1950s, significantly reducing the likelihood of war. An ICBM, by definition, can deliver a warhead over 5,500 kilometres, establishing a nation’s second-strike capability and serving as a deterrent against full-scale conflict.
Strategic military decisions, particularly those involving ICBMs, require clear doctrines, defined missions, political resolve and technological readiness. In the aftermath of the Iran-Israel conflict—sparked by Israel’s unfounded fears of an imminent Iranian nuclear threat—many Indian academics and analysts have turned their attention to Pakistan, launching baseless allegations regarding a supposed Pakistani ICBM program.
Historically, foreign concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program revolved around fears of proliferation to non-state actors like the Taliban. However, through effective internal safeguards and responsible stewardship, Pakistan has successfully countered such narratives. Despite this, a new smear campaign has emerged, now focused on an alleged and unsubstantiated ICBM development.
Unlike the bipolar strategic competition of the Cold War, Pakistan harbours no global hegemonic ambitions and maintains a defensive, India-centric nuclear doctrine. It enjoys cooperative relations with the US, particularly in counter-terrorism efforts and does not perceive global powers as existential threats. Developing ICBMs would serve no strategic purpose and only invite international scrutiny, hampering Pakistan’s legitimate missile and nuclear programs.
For comparison, China’s expansion of its ICBM arsenal is grounded in concerns over a potential US first-strike. Pakistan’s leadership has never made such an assessment, nor is there any official doctrine supporting such capabilities. Additionally, Pakistan still seeks self-sufficiency in satellite and space launch technologies, both critical prerequisites for developing an ICBM. Even if Pakistan possessed space launch vehicles, mastering the complex re-entry phase—where a warhead must survive hypersonic speed and extreme heat—is a separate and more advanced challenge. No credible intelligence, even from adversaries, indicates Pakistan has achieved this.
India’s own overt ICBM development, driven by its self-proclaimed global ambitions, poses a more tangible threat to regional and global stability. Its shift toward preemptive counterforce doctrines raises legitimate concerns. Yet, alarmist narratives about Pakistan’s intentions ignore these developments and reflect a biased and irresponsible academic stance.
Such disinformation efforts are part of India’s broader fifth-generation warfare strategy aimed at discrediting Pakistan’s credible and responsible nuclear posture. Publishing unverified claims not only undermines academic integrity but risks creating mistrust among states that otherwise maintain constructive relationships.
—The author is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network.
(aliabbas_changezi@hotmail.com)
