Youm-e-Takbeer — whither security?
A quarter of a century following Pakistan’s crossing the nuclear threshold—a day commemorated as “ Youm-e-Takbeer ” — it is being questioned whether Pakistan is more secure today? India declaredly, embarked upon a military nuclear program in 1974 after its first nuclear test at Pokhran. Pakistan had no option but to follow suit because of the threat India’s nuclear programme posed to the region. On 11 and 13 May 1998, New Delhi again tested its nuclear devices and went into a jingoistic fever, intimidating Islamabad with dire consequences, forcing Pakistan to come out of its nuclear closet on 28 May 1998.
One would have assumed that subsequent to Pakistan’s declaration of its nuclear assets, India would have rested on its laurels but its limitless xenophobia impelled it to cross different milestones in its quest for achieving nuclear superiority. Indian defence planners aspired to develop the nuclear triad: aerial, surface and sub-surface based nuclear weapons which would be a stepping stone in absorbing a nuclear first strike and delivering a telling second strike blow.
Prima facie, India tends to compete with China—raising its bogey time and again—despite the fact that China has extended it the hand of friendship, is reaching out to invest in India and also resolve its border issues with it. In reality India attempts to browbeat Pakistan, while New Delhi’s military strategies including the Cold Start Doctrine are Pakistan centric. Since the Cold War Doctrine — based on the German strategy of Blitzkrieg—was designed to rapidly strike Pakistan with quick response forces and decimate Pakistan before it could deploy its nukes, Pakistan had to devise a counter strategy by developing battlefield tactical nuclear weapons.
Indian articulation of its ambition is vividly depicted in its Maritime Security Strategy of 2015—”Ensuring Secure Seas”. Various steps taken by India in the near past to nuclearize the Indian Ocean comprise, constructing or acquiring nuclear powered submarines and conventional sub-surface platforms equipped with weapon systems armed with nuclear warheads. The INS Chakra, an Akula class submarine leased from Russia, the construction of the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) Project, under the joint supervision of the Indian Navy, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has been under development since 1999. This project produced its first nuclear ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant, followed by the INS Arighat, S4 and S4*. India is also developing the longer-range K-4 SLBM, with a 3,500-kilometer range, a naval version of the Agni-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).
Indian Navy’s area of operation includes the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Bay of Bengal, which comprise numerous sea lines of communication (SLOC) chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab El Mandeb, and the Malacca Straits. Almost 97% of India’s foreign trade by volume and 60% of the world’s sea-borne trade and energy resources are transported through these strategic bottlenecks. With its advanced naval platforms, India will be able to deny the SLOCs for other littoral states while keeping its own routes open.
Pakistan is keen to keep the Indian Ocean denuclearized but at the same time it is eager to acquire civil nuclear energy to meet its requirements for power. For starters, consistent with its commitment to the objectives of non-proliferation support for international efforts towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, Pakistan has adopted Policy Guide on Strategic Export Controls which harmonize Pakistan’s national export control measures with those multilateral export control regimes, including the NSG. Thus, on 18 May 2016, Pakistan formally applied to the International Atomic Energy Agency seeking acceptance to the NSG, although the Indian application predates Pakistan’s and if India gets accepted earlier, it will be in a position to block Pakistan’s entry into the NSG. Pakistan’s work is cut out to pursue its application and ensure that it gets accepted simultaneously. It must commence a serious diplomatic exercise to approach each and every one of the 48 NSG members to garner their support for Pakistan’s entry into the NSG.
In the same vein it must proceed to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which is an informal and voluntary association of countries which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and which seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. The MTCR was originally established in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Since that time, the number of MTCR partners has increased to a total of thirty five countries, all of which have equal standing within the Regime. There are 32 littoral states in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan needs to muster the support of the other thirty and make a strong petition in the United Nations to have the Indian Ocean declared a nuclear free zone.
Pakistan’s nuclear program, which was a thorn in the sides of many a world power, is again in the crosshairs of its detractors. A forced regime change enabled the IAEA to gain access to Islamabad’s nuclear sites and machinations are afoot to coerce Pakistan to roll back its nuclear weapons program. To date, Pakistan’s nukes deterred would be aggressors from launching attacks against Pakistan but if the domestic political turmoil enable the enemies of Pakistan to achieve their heinous goals of defanging Pakistan’s nukes and dismembering it, all the sacrifices of its engineers, scientists and technicians to keep Pakistan safe, would be in vain. If Pakistan is to be made truly secure, it must set its own house in order.
The corridors of power in Islamabad must be occupied by parliamentarians elected by its people and not proxies of foreign powers with their vested interest in subjugating Pakistan. Simultaneously, there is the need for exposing Indian designs to subvert the peace and tranquillity of South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Youm-e-Takbeer was meant to make Pakistan safe from the nefarious designs of its detractors. Let us resolve to do so effectively and not become tools of those plotting to enslave us.
—The writer is a Retired Group Captain of PAF, who has written several books on China.
Email: sultanm.hali@gmail.com
